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Abstract In this paper we compare behaviour in a newspaper experiment with be-
haviour in the laboratory. Our workhorse is the Yes-No game. Unlike in ultimatum
games responders of the Yes-No games do not know the proposal when deciding
whether to accept or not. We use two different amounts that can be shared (100€
and 1000€). Unlike in other experiments with the ultimatum game we find a (small)
effect of the size of the stakes. In line with findings for the ultimatum game, we find
more generosity among women, older participants, and participants who submit their
decision via postal mail than via Internet. By comparing our results with other stud-
ies (using executives or students), we demonstrate, at least for this type of game, the
external validity of lab research.
Keywords Newspaper experiment · External validity · Yes-No game
JEL Classification C91 · C93
1 Introduction
One aim of this study is to learn more about external validity of laboratory experi-
ments with student participants. Since students are similar in age and education such
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laboratory experiments leave open the question how far results from the lab can be
generalised.
To increase the variance of socio-demographic characteristics in the subject pool
Roth et al. (1991) study the ultimatum game with students from different nationalities
and find clear differences in behaviour between these groups. Murnighan and Saxon
(1998) look at the behaviour of children and observe that generosity in the ultimatum
game decreases with age. In a similar study with children Harbaugh et al. (2003)
find that, once one controls for size, generosity increases with age. In a newspaper
experiment with the ultimatum game (Güth et al. 2003) the medium of participation,
Internet or postal mail, has an effect on generosity. Güth et al. (2007) look at a three-
person ultimatum game and show that fairness and rejection rates increase with age.
Köhler et al. (2007) play an ultimatum game with a heterogeneous sample of German
adults illustrating that generosity increases with age and income. Integrating their
experiment into an existing survey, the Dutch CentER panel, Bellemare et al. (2008)
let their participants play either the ultimatum or the dictator game and confirm that
generosity increases with age.
Using the trust game, Fehr and List (2004) compare the behaviour of students
with that of CEOs who turn out to be more trusting, more trustworthy, and who
punish less. Fehr et al. (2003) report data from a trust game with a randomly selected
sample of German households. Bellemare and Kröger (2007) compare behaviour in
the trust game played by students and households of the CentER panel to find a
hump-shaped relation between age and trust, and a U-shaped relation between age
and trustworthiness. Bornhorst et al. (2010) play a trust game with Ph.D. students
of different nationalities and find significant differences in trust and trustworthiness
between different regions of origin. Sutter and Kocher (2007) study a trust game with
participants from different age groups and observe a hump-shaped relation between
age and trust and increasing trustworthiness with age.1
To explain why non-students outside the lab and students within the lab behave
differently, Pull (1999) and Selten (2000) argue that student participants in a lab en-
vironment react more clearly to subtle strategic details than non-students outside the
lab. It is, hence, essential to compare behaviour of student participants with a more
heterogeneous population in other games, especially those related to the previously
explored ones by differing only in subtle details. This is what we want to do in this
paper.2 We will use a very simple and abstract game and concentrate on analysing the
effect of stakes and the effects of the subject pool on the offers and on the willingness
to accept.
Our workhorse is the Yes-No game which is a game where proposers suggest how
to share a given positive monetary amount and responders decide without knowing
the proposal. From ultimatum games (see Camerer 2003, for a survey of ultimatum
experiments), Yes-No games differ since responders in ultimatum games know what
1Other games that have been studied with heterogeneous groups of participants include the beauty-contest
game of Bosch-Domenech et al. (2002) or the prisoners’ dilemma in the TV show “Friend or Foe” studied
by List (2006).
2Other limitations of laboratory experiments are due to the controlled or artificial situation in the lab
(see Levitt and List 2007). We concede that these limitations exist, however, we do not deal with these
limitations here.
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they accept or reject.3 Unlike to dictator experiments (e.g. Forsythe et al. 1994), the
responder in Yes-No games still has full veto power in the sense that without his
consent the pie of 100€ or 1000€ is lost.
We find the Yes-No game an interesting game for several reasons:
• Many offers or opportunities in real life contain a certain as well as an uncertain
component. E.g. a work contract might specify an explicit salary but might be silent
about working hours, pensions, obligations of the worker and much more. Other
examples include so-called experience goods whose quality is not known to cus-
tomers or partnership proposals without knowing how reliable the partner(s) will
be, as e.g. in joint ventures or spouse relationships. The ultimatum game studies as
one extreme the (artificial) situation of an offer with no uncertainty at all. Every-
thing that can be said about the offer is known to the responder. The Yes-No game
looks at the other extreme: A situation where the offer is entirely unknown to the
responder.
• The Yes-No game also sheds new light on motives of behaviour in situations like
the ultimatum game. Do proposers make generous offers in the ultimatum game
because they fear rejection of a lower offer? Since the offer is unknown to the
responder low offers are not more likely to be rejected than high offers. Proposers
who make high offers must have other reasons.
Even more interestingly, responders who reject unfair offers in the ultimatum
game should when they expect to receive unfair offers in the Yes-No game reject
these offers, too.
We already know from ultimatum games with private information (Güth et al.
1996), where only the proposer knows whether the pie is large or small, that most
proposers who could divide the large pie offered only a fair share of the small pie
which was never rejected by the responder.
Such response behaviour can be explained either by “in dubio pro reo” (the
pie could be small) or by “in dubio pro meo” (better little than nothing). In the
Yes-No game accepting an unknown offer can be similarly justified (Gehrig et al.
2007). But since in the Yes-No game the proposer can be more exploitative by
offering only the smallest positive amount the responder may expect less what
could weaken the “in dubio pro meo” argument. Will we therefore observe more
rejections (No) by responders who expect a low offer? Will these rejections be
more frequent if the pie is small (100€) and punishment is cheap?
• Another reason for using the Yes-No game is, of course, that it only differs from the
ultimatum game by one subtle detail, namely that one does not know the proposal
when exercising one’s veto power. Is this a detail overlooked more frequently by
non-students than by student participants? Furthermore, is it possible that not only
students but also executives are paying more attention to subtleties like these. Do
we have reasons to single out important and economically relevant subgroups of
non-students?
3The extensive form of the Yes-No game is one with imperfect but complete information whereas for the
ultimatum game the extensive form has perfect and complete information. Incomplete information has
been explored experimentally, for instance, by Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993).
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In this paper we want to describe properties of a heterogeneous population playing
the Yes-No game. Will participants with a socio-demographic background different
from students as responders also rely to the same degree on “in dubio pro reo” or “in
dubio pro meo”? And will they as proposers yield to the exploitation incentive or will
they feel more committed to fairness concerns, at least when the pie is small (and
exploitation less profitable)?
In Sect. 2, we introduce the design of the experiment and discuss some hypothe-
ses which, in Sect. 3, are tested with the help of the rather large data set (involving
altogether 1175 participants). Section 4 concludes.
2 Experiment
In this paper we will compare five different media to participate in the experiment:
• 112 participants of a traditional lab experiment run by Gehrig et al. (2007) with
low stakes,4
• 64 participants of a lab experiment with high stakes where only some participants
are paid,
• 303 participants of a newspaper experiment with high stakes where only some
participants are paid and who chose to respond by postal mail,
• 568 participants of the same newspaper experiment with high stakes who chose to
make their decision via the Internet,
• 128 business executives who play essentially the same situation with high stakes
and who respond with pencil and paper.5
Table 1 shows characteristics of participants for the different media of participation.6
Figure 1 shows boxplots of the distribution of age for the media of participation where
we know the age.
For the media of participation with high stakes we used the strategy vector method,
i.e. all participants submitted strategies and expectations for a pie of 100€ and for a
pie of 1000€ and for both positions in the game (X and Y ).7 After all participants had
submitted their decisions a small number of participants were selected to be rewarded
by actually playing the game. First, these participants were randomly grouped into
pairs of two players. One of these two players was the proposer in the Yes-No game
4Here we refer only to what Gehrig et al. (2007) call their “first experiment series”. The games in their
“second experiment series” were embedded in a bidding mechanism rendering the data less comparable to
ours.
5As usual the specifics of the company will not be revealed by us.
6To keep the experiment simple we elicited only these characteristics together with the strategies and
expectations for the game. Details of the implementation are shown in the online-appendix B (see Online
Supplementary Material).
7One might suspect that eliciting two offers, one for 100€ and another for 1000€, implies a demand effect.
We fully agree that the differences in behaviour between the two amounts could perhaps be smaller had we
used the game method. However, using the strategy vector method greatly simplifies the implementation
of the newspaper experiment. Furthermore, here we are not interested in the absolute size of the effect but
rather how this effect depends on other variables.
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Internet 568 91.0 48.9 82.2 39.0 40.0 61.4 13.5
Mail 303 99.3 57.5 96.0 49.8 50.0 65.0 27.4
Lab high stakes 64 100.0 56.2 100.0 23.0 21.0 100.0 0.0
Executives 128 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
Lab small stakes 112 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 1175 75.1 52.4 70.0 41.6 42.0 62.8 13.7
Fig. 1 Boxplot of age for
different media of participation
with high stakes
(X-player), the other the responder (Y -player). Another random draw decided which
pairs had to divide 100€ and which had to divide 1000€. For each pair the X-player
chose a division. To simplify the use of the strategy vector method as well as the
evaluation of the questionnaires we only allowed 10 possible divisions between 5€
and 95€ when 100€ could be divided. Similarly, 10 divisions between 50€ and
950€ were allowed when 1000€ could be divided. When the Y -player chose “yes”
the amount was divided according to the proposal of the X-player. In case of “no”
both players received zero. Details of the implementation are explained in the online-
appendix B.
A materially opportunistic responder should accept the unknown but necessar-
ily positive offer. Anticipating such opportunism, an equally opportunistic proposer
should offer the lowest possible amount. We, however, do expect only few partici-
pants to behave in line with such common opportunism.
Whether “stakes” matter is often explored by using the same stakes in rich and
poor countries, i.e., stake variation relies on large discrepancies of living conditions
(see, e.g. Cameron 1999). We avoid confounding “stake” and culture in our within-
subjects design: the same participants decide for a small (100€) and a much larger
(1000€) pie. In view of the stake independence observed for offers in the closely
related ultimatum game (Hoffman et al. 1996) we expect the relative shares, offered
by proposers for both pie sizes, to be similar. Hoffman et al. (1996) also observe that
rejection rates in ultimatum games are lower when stakes are higher. A reason might
be that “teaching fairness to proposers” might be too expensive when stakes are high.
We hence expect lower rejection rates for high stakes.
We also suspect that student participants in the laboratory might be more clearly
aware of the crucial aspect of the Yes-No game and that their behaviour is closer to
the equilibrium solution of the game. As in Eckel and Grossman (1998, 2001) we
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Fig. 2 Boxplot of relative offers and frequencies of rejections. The diagram on the left shows boxplots of
relative offers for the different media of participation and the different amounts that are to be divided. The
diagram on the right shows relative frequencies of rejections
expect women to be more generous than men. In line with Harbaugh et al. (2003),
Güth et al. (2007), Köhler et al. (2007) and Bellemare et al. (2008) we expect that
older participants offer more as proposers and reject less as responders. In line with
Güth et al. (2003) we expect “more fairness in the mail than in the Internet”.
3 Results
Stakes: The left part of Fig. 2 shows boxplots for offers for the different stakes
and the different media of participation.8 For a given medium of participation the
median relative offer is always the same for 100€ and for 1000€. With small stakes
of 20€ small relative offers are more frequent. That, however, might be due to several
parameters that were different in the 20€ small stakes experiment by Gehrig et al.
(2007) for the participants of experiments with large stakes. For an amount of 100€
the average offered share is 0.376 of the entire amount, for an amount of 1000€
the average offered share is with 0.364 slightly smaller. This difference is small, but
significant9.
The right part of Fig. 2 shows frequencies of rejections. For three out of four
media of participation (postal mail, Internet, executives) rejection rates are lower
for stakes of 1000€. In the lab situation we have exactly one rejection and this for
1000€. Taken together, for 100€ altogether 6.6% of all participants reject, whereas
for 1000€ only 4.5% of all participants reject. The difference is significant.10
8The data in this paper was analysed with R version 2.14.1 (2011-12-22) (R Development Core Team
2011).
9An exact paired Wilcoxon test based on the Shift Algorithm by Streitberg and Röhmel (1986) yields a
p-value of 0.00004, a paired t -test yields a p-value of 0.00008.
10A one-sided Fisher’s exact test for independence of the amount yields a p-value of 0.0234.
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Fig. 3 Average relative offers and rejection rates for males and females. Graphs show own choices (rel-
ative offer and reject) and expected choices (expOffer and expReject) of the other player. The lines are
lowess-splines (Cleveland 1981) based on the defaults of R’s plsmo function (see R Development Core
Team 2011. plsmo is a function that plots smoothed estimates based on a lowess smoother). The gray area
is a 95%-confidence band for the average behaviour of males and females for all media of participation
where we know the age
Lab versus field: While there is a small effect of stakes on rejection rates Fig. 2
reveals a large effect of the subject pool. Students in laboratory experiments are much
closer to the game theoretic solution and reject rarely, regardless whether stakes are
20€, 100€, or 1000€. Rejection rates outside the lab are significantly higher than
inside the lab.11 There is no significant difference between rejection rates for high
stakes and the experiment with small stakes done by Gehrig et al. (2007).12
Age and gender: The left graph in Fig. 3 shows how offers and expected offers
depend on age and the gender of the decision makers. Offers clearly increase with age.
Furthermore, females are more generous. This is in line with Eckel and Grossman
(1998, 2001).13 Expected offers do not seem to depend on gender.
The right graph in Fig. 3 shows how rejection rates depend on age and gender. Also
rejection rates increase with age. There does not seem to be a systematic difference
between males and females in rejection rates. Expected offers are lower than actual
offers and expected rejection rates are higher than actual rates. In particular female
expectations of rejection rates are too pessimistic.
Age and medium of participation: The left part of Fig. 4 shows how average offers
depend on the age group and on the medium of participation. For media of partic-
ipation where we have a large number of young and old participants (postal mail,
11For high stakes we find rejection rates in the lab 0.8% and rejection rates elsewhere 5.9%. A Fisher’s
exact test for independence yields a p-value of 0.0086.
12For high stakes we find a rejection rate of 0.8% while Gehrig et al. (2007) find for small stakes 0%.
A Fisher’s exact test for independence of lab and field yields a p-value of 1.
13A mixed effects regression where we control for stakes, age, the medium of participation, gender, and the
subject pool finds age and gender to be significant (see specification 2 in Table 2 in the online appendix).
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Fig. 4 Average relative offers and rejection rates for medium of participation and stakes. Graphs show
own choices (relative offer and reject) and expected choices (expOffer and expReject) of the other player.
The lines are lowess-splines based on the defaults of R’s plsmo function. Data for business executives
and for the lab experiment with small stakes are shown as horizontal lines since we have no information
on the exact age for these groups. The gray area is a 95%-confidence band for the average behaviour of
males and females for all media of participation where we know the age
Internet) offers clearly increase with age. For the remaining media of participation
(lab small stakes, lab large stakes, executives) the offers are approximately consistent
with the age group. This holds for actual offers as well as for expected offers and is
in line with what Harbaugh et al. (2003), Güth et al. (2007), Köhler et al. (2007) and
Bellemare et al. (2008) find for ultimatum games.
The right part of Fig. 4 shows the relation between rejection rates and age. Al-
though actual rejection rates hardly depend on the stakes, expected rejection rates do
so very much.14
Correlation between own choice and expectations: Do participants who make gen-
erous offers expect similar offers? And are participants who expect frequent rejec-
tions more likely to reject themselves? The answer to both questions is “yes”. The
left graph in Fig. 5 shows a bubble-plot of expectations over offers. We see that on
the individual level own relative offers and expected offers are clearly correlated. Par-
ticipants who make small offers expect small offers from others. Participants who are
generous expect generous offers from other participants. The right graph in Fig. 5
shows a mosaicplot of actual and expected rejections. Again, we find that expec-
tations are in line with choices. Participants who expect low rejection rates seldom
reject. There are not many participants who expect a high rejection rate but those who
do will reject rather frequently.
14A mixed effects regression where we explain expected rejection rates as a function of stakes, age, the
medium of participation, gender, and the subject pool finds stakes to be highly significant (see Table 5 in
the online appendix).
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Fig. 5 Own choices and expectations in the newspaper experiment. The area of the circles (in the left dia-
gram) and the area of the rectangles (in the right diagram) are proportional to the number of observations.
The solid line in the left diagram shows an OLS regression of expectations on offers
4 Conclusion
Lab research is often questioned by arguing that the stakes are minor, student par-
ticipants are not representative, and experimental games are far too abstract. Here
we concentrate on the first two issues, i.e. whether the size of the pie matters and
whether student participants are representative. The Yes-No-game is simple enough
to be understood by reasonably educated newspaper readers and executives. It also
captures some important aspect of life, namely the need to accept or reject some deal
whose profitability has already been determined or manipulated but is not known to
the responder.
With respect to the first issue, size of stakes, we have explored stake dependence by
quite high pie sizes of 100€ and 1000€. Of course, the random selection of only 40
participants questions the stake size. Still, there is little evidence for random payment
effects (see, for instance Cubitt et al. 1998). While Hoffman et al. (1996) reports no
significant effect of the stake size for the ultimatum game we find for the Yes-No
game a significant effect of stakes on the aggregate level. Of course, the effect is
small and is only significant due to the large number of 1175 participants. Still, it is
possible that also for other games the impact of stakes could be small, but different
from zero. With a limited number of participants in the lab small effects might be
harder to detect than with a large number of newspaper readers.
With respect to the second point, representativeness of the student population,
we agree that students belong to a rather narrow age bracket. We have found three
important socio-demographic variables: age, gender, and the medium of participation
(postal mail vs. Internet). Here our observations confirm most of our expectations.
In line with Eckel and Grossman (1998, 2001) women are more generous. Similar to
Güth et al. (2003) there is more “fairness in the mail and more material opportunism
in the Internet”. Consistent with Harbaugh et al. (2003), Güth et al. (2007), Köhler et
al. (2007) and Bellemare et al. (2008) we find older people to be more generous.
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In particular—once we control for age—results from the field are surprisingly con-
sistent with behaviour in the lab. Newspaper readers with the age of laboratory par-
ticipants behave very similar to laboratory participants. Older participants are more
generous and reject more frequently. The newspaper study can, thus, be seen as a nat-
ural extension of the laboratory. It allows us to easily access a more heterogeneous
subject pool.
There are many games which so far have only been researched in the lab. We have
seen in this paper that one has to be careful when extrapolating from these labora-
tory results to the field. We have also seen that newspaper experiments can help us
to learn more about external validity since the group of participants is more hetero-
geneous than those in the laboratory. Newspaper experiments also include typically
many more participants. This allows us to detect small, but perhaps interesting, ef-
fects.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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